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The origins of the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960) have been debated 
over the years in both the academic world and in the intelligence 
community. This paper incorporates the contemporaneous views of the 
Malayan Special Branch that have not been recorded previously. It also  
examines the role of Lawrence (Lance) Sharkey, the acting Secretary-
General of the Australian Communist Party, who was in Singapore en 
route back to Australia after attending the February 1948 Conferences in 
Singapore, in allegedly passing instructions to the Communist Party of 
Malaya (CPM) to revolt against the British colonial government in Malaya.  
The essay will conclude that there is little evidence of any direct Soviet 
intervention in the decision made by the CPM to revolt, and it will argue 
that the decision to resort to armed conflict was made after its failure to 
establish a Communist People’s Democratic Republic by “open front” 
activities.  
 
Keywords: Malayan Special Branch, 1948 Malayan Emergency, Cold 
War in Asia, Communist Party of Malaya, 1948 Calcutta 
Conferences, Australian Communist Party 
 
 
 
 
1   This is a revised edition of a paper presented at the Roundtable on the 
Sixtieth Anniversary of 1948: Reassessing the Origins of the Cold War in 
Southeast Asia, organised by the Asian Research Institute (ARI), National 
University of Singapore, 10–11 July 2008. 
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THE BACKGROUND 
The academic world and the intelligence community have long debated the 
origins of the 1948–1960 communist uprising in Malaya. Was the decision 
to raise the standard of revolt in June 1948 part of a global revolutionary 
movement orchestrated by the Soviet Union as part of the Cold War in 
Asia, or was it instead arrived at by the Communist Party of Malaya 
(CPM) based on the local situation in Malaya?
2 Or was it rather a mix of 
both? Many thousands of words have been written on these questions in 
the intervening years, but a definitive answer will likely have to await the 
release of the Soviet Union documents.
3
Meanwhile, this paper presents the viewpoint of a Special Branch officer 
who served as a Malayan Police Special Branch officer during the Malayan 
Emergency (1948–1960) and who participated in the discussions 
(referenced later) that took place at Federal Special Branch headquarters in 
Kuala Lumpur during the early 1949. These discussions concerned the 
origins of the uprising of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) against 
the government.   
Firstly, we summarise the background. The first question postulated above 
takes its starting point from Andrei Zhdanov’s well-known speech at the 
inaugural meeting of the Cominform on 27 September 1947. Zhdanov 
argued that the world had been polarised into two opposing camps, that is, 
the communist bloc led by the Soviet Union and the Western capitalist 
countries led by the United States.
4 His speech encouraged a militant 
                                                 
2    See Tilman Remme, Britain and Regional Cooperation in South-East Asia, 
1945–1949, London & New York: LSE /Routledge, 1995, 134, and A.J. 
Stockwell (ed.), Malaya, Part 1. The Malayan Union Experiment 1942–
1948, London: HMSO, 1995, xiii. 
3    The conclusion reached by the Malayan Special Branch in 1949, as related 
in this paper, that the Soviets were not behind the Communist Party of 
Malaya’s uprising against the Malayan government in June 1948 was 
subsequently corroborated by Dr. L.M. Efimova, a Soviet delegate to the 
ARI Roundtable, 10–11 July 2008, who has carried out extensive research 
into the Soviet archives in Moscow. As far as is known, this is the first time 
that the Soviet archives have been consulted. 
4  Andrei Zhdanov (1896–1958) was a Politburo member and Stalin’s 
representative on the COMINFORM. In the mid-1940s, he was seen by 
many observers as the likely successor to Joseph Stalin as head of the 
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approach by worldwide communist parties to propagating revolution in the 
Third World. The same line was repeated by E.M. Zhukov, who had 
attended the inaugural meeting of the Cominform with Zhdanov, in his 
article in the December 1947 issue of the Bol’shevik that referred to the 
“sharpening crisis of the colonial system” (author’s emphasis) being 
“perhaps one of the most significant efforts to apply Zhdanov’s doctrine to 
Asia”.
5 On this basis, a Soviet Conspiracy Theory has been developed that 
postulates that the Soviets had in some way transmitted “instructions” to 
the representatives of Southeast Asian communist parties attending the 
Communist Youth Conference, held from 19 February to 24 February 1948 
in Calcutta, to take advantage of the unstable conditions prevailing in 
Southeast Asia at the end of the Second World War to rise up against their 
colonial rulers.
6   
                                                                                                             
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. He postulated that foreign 
communist parties should be in the vanguard of spreading communism 
throughout the world, and he was particularly critical of the failure of the 
French and Italian communist parties to seize power by militant 
revolutionary action. He anticipated Soviet foreign policy shifting its focus 
to the Far East, where the Chinese Communist Party was gaining control of 
China, and he thought of the national liberation movements of Southeast 
Asia forming the vanguard of the colonial emancipation struggle in support 
of international communism (see “The Zhdanov–Malenkov Relationship”, 
Caesar, Polo, and ESEU Papers. Cold War Era hard target analysis of 
Soviet and Chinese policy  and decision making 1953–1973, Washington, 
DC, CIA, top secret, 2007 (declassified); Australian Public Records Office, 
Canberra, A56189/A2908/1, 1950, “Situation in Malaya”, item M108, 
secret cipher telegram, Harrison from Menzies, 41; J.H. Brummel,  A Short 
History of the Malayan Communist Party, Singapore: Donald Moore Press, 
1956, 19; and Tilman Remme, op. cit., 134.   
5      See Yano Toru, “Who Set the Stage for the Cold War in Asia?” in 
Yonosuke Nagai & Akira Iriye (eds.), The Origins of the Cold War in Asia, 
Columbia University Press, 1974, 333. 
6      In 1948, communist uprisings started in Burma, the Philippines, and 
Hyderabad (India). Meanwhile, armed communist revolts had already 
broken out in Indonesia and Vietnam (Lennox A. Mills, British Malaya, 
1824–1867,  Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1966, 51), and a 
“Communist League” had been formed in Thailand (Remme, op. cit., 137). 
The armed struggle of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) against 
British colonial rule in Malaya and Singapore, which became known as the 
“Emergency”, started in June 1948. A crisis arose, too, in Europe when 
Soviet forces closed entry by road to Berlin from the west. The US and 
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There were two Communist conferences held in Calcutta in February and 
March 1948. The first was the Communist Youth Conference, held from 
19 February 1948 to 24 February 1948, which was sponsored by the World 
Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) and the Conference of Youth 
and Students of South-East Asia fighting for Freedom and Independence.
7  
The other was the 2
nd Congress of the Communist Party of India (CPI) held 
from 28 February 1948  to 6 March 1948.  The conferences were well 
attended by a wide range of communist delegates from Vietnam, 
Indonesia, Ceylon, Burma, India, Pakistan, Nepal, the Philippines and 
Malaya, with observers from Australia, Korea, Mongolia, Soviet Central 
Asia, Yugoslavia, France, Hungary, Canada, Czechoslovakia and the 
Soviet Union.     
According to what Chin Peng, Secretary-General of the CPM, told the 
author in Canberra in February 1999, the CPM did not receive an invitation 
to attend either of the Calcutta conferences,
8 although Lee Soong, General 
Secretary of the Malayan WFDY, received an invitation to attend the 
Youth Conference.
9 The CPM’s Central Executive Committee approved 
Lee’s attendance at the Conference.
10 Lee was a Singapore-Chinese of 
                                                                                                             
British forces responded by airlifting supplies to the city, and the blockade 
was eventually lifted in May 1949. 
7   The WFDY was one of the main instruments for the implementation of 
Soviet international policy. See Alexander Kharlamov, “Youth Conference 
in Calcutta”, Moscow News, 3 April 1948, for an interesting Soviet account 
of the Conference, at which a resolution was passed supporting “the 
national liberation struggle against imperialism” but there is no mention of 
the  resolution going beyond this. 
8    Conversation Comber/Chin Peng, Ruby Restaurant, Dickson, Canberra, 19 
February 1999. This was subsequently confirmed in Chin Peng’s 
autobiography that was published a few years after the author’s 
conversation with him in Canberra. (Chin Peng, with Ian Ward & Norma 
Miraflor, Alias Chin Peng. My Side of the Story, Singapore: Media Masters, 
2003, 202). It is, however, rather strange that the CPM did not receive an 
invitation to attend the conferences if it was the intention of the Soviets to 
issue “instructions”  to the Southeast Asian communist parties  to take up 
arms against their colonial masters. 
9    Conversation Comber/Chin Peng, Ruby Restaurant, Dickson, Canberra, 19 
February 1999. 
10    CO 537/3751, MSS Political Intelligence Journal, Secret, No. 1/48, Who’s 
Who,  Serial No. 10. P.F. 1.97, Singapore. Lee Soong, also spelt in 
Romanised form Lee Sung, was a Teochew, born in Singapore in 1927. In 
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CPM State Committee rank who, like many Singapore-Chinese, was fluent 
in English, the language used at the conference.  
  Returning to the Soviet Conspiracy theory, the best known exponents of 
the theory are probably the US scholars Walt W. Rustow, A. Doak Barnett, 
and Frank N. Trager, who argued that instructions to start armed uprisings 
had been passed on from the Soviet “centre” to representatives of the 
Southeast Asian communist parties attending the Calcutta conferences.
11 
The leading proponent of the opposite school of thought was Ruth T. 
McVey, who called into question whether the Soviet Union had issued any 
such instructions. Over the years many, other historians followed this 
critical path, with Anthony Stockwell’s paper “Chin Peng and the Struggle 
for Malaya” (2006) as a recent example.
12 In her 1958 study, McVey had 
summed up the situation by saying that in the unsettled conditions that 
prevailed in Southeast Asia after the Japanese surrender at the end of the 
war, “it does not seem likely that the two-camp message [sic] lit the 
revolutionary spark in Southeast Asia though it may well have added the 
extra tinder which caused it to burst into flames”.
13  In his classic study of 
                                                                                                             
September 1945, he was a member of the British Military Administration’s 
Singapore Advisory Council as well as being a member of the CPM’s 
Singapore Town Committee. In July 1947, he attended with Chen Tian the 
WDYL meeting in Prague as a representative of the Pan-Malayan New 
Democratic Youth League. Both men returned to Singapore in November 
1947. During their stay in Prague, they had been tasked inter alia by the 
CPM’s Central Executive Committee to find out whether Lai Teck, the then 
CPM’s Secretary-General, who had absconded from Malaya in February 
1947 taking with him the main part of the CPM’s funds, had fled to Europe, 
and whether there was any truth in his claim to have international 
Comintern status. Lee Soong was later killed in an engagement with the 
security forces in Johore in 1954. 
11  It is worth noting that R.B. Smith (China and Southeast Asia: The 
Revolutionary Perspective, 1951, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, XIX, 
No. 1, March 1988, 98) writes that before 1951, the British official view 
was inclined to accept the Soviet Conspiracy Theory, but afterwards they 
changed their view and played down the suggestion of external 
involvement in the CPM’s decision to take up arms. 
12  R u t h  Y .  M c V e y ,  The Calcutta Conferences and the Southeast Asian 
Uprisings, Ithaca, NY:  Department of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell 
University, 1958, and  Anthony Stockwell, “Chin Peng and the Struggle for 
Malaya”, The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 6(1), 2006, 279–297. 
13    McVey, op. cit., 24. 
43 Leon Comber 
the Emergency, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, Anthony Short 
was rather more circumspect, and while he did not specifically support the 
Soviet Conspiracy Theory, he reasoned that while the “(Calcutta) 
conference did not openly declare for insurrection its mood was one of 
extreme belligerence towards colonial rule”.
14  This is undoubtedly correct 
as it reflects the standard communist line, and in fact during the post-war 
period, even the US, the leader of the Western capitalist countries, 
expressed reservations about the continuation of British, French and Dutch 
colonial rule in Southeast Asia.
15    
Professor Mary Turnbull’s essay in The Cambridge History of Southeast 
Asia (1992) came out clearly against the “Soviet Conspiracy Theory” in the 
following words: “In fact the period was one of confused ambitions for the 
communists. Their various revolts and wars in Indonesia, Malaya, Vietnam 
and Burma, were not part (author’s emphasis) of a grand pre-planned 
Soviet strategy, such as Lenin’s dream of communist revolution in Asia or 
the Comintern’s ambitious design to use China in the 1920s as the means 
of realising this dream. While the Soviet Union had shown little interest in 
Southeast Asia, apart from the 1920s Comintern interlude, the Chinese 
Communist Party posed a more immediate threat.”
16   
As of 2007 however, it was clear that the controversy was still attracting 
scholarly attention, as the subject was discussed again in Philip Deery’s 
paper “Malaya, 1948: Britain”s Asian Cold War’
17, which was the focus of 
an interesting H-Diplo review article by Karl Hack.  In his review article, 
                                                 
14    Anthony  Short,  The Communist Insurrection in Malaya 1948–1960, 
London: Frederick Muller Ltd., 1975, 45–49, (reprinted in 2000 by 
Cultured Lotus Press, Singapore, under the title In Pursuit of Mountain 
Rats). 
15    Short, op. cit., 46–47. 
16  C.M. Turnbull, “The Beginning of the Cold War, 1948–1954”, in The 
Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, The nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries  (ed. Nicholas Tarling), 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992, 600. See also John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War, London: 
Allen Lane, 2005, 121, 122, and 126, who reasoned that the propagation of 
revolution in the Third World was less important to the Soviet Union in the 
immediate post-war period than recovery from the war and attempting to 
spread Communist influence. 
17    Philip Deery, “Malaya: Britain’s Asian Cold War”, Journal of Cold War 
Studies, 9(1), 2007, 29–54. 
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Karl Hack argued that the “Soviet role needs to be given at least some 
weight within nuanced, multicausal models of the outbreak of the “Asian 
Cold War”, and that the MCP did have a programme intended to end in 
armed revolt within months, even though the British precipitated this’.
18     
Nevertheless, the debate appears to have largely overlooked the fact that 
The Times (London) had long ago (June 1948) taken the view there was 
little evidence of direct Soviet intervention in the rise of revolutionary 
movements then taking place in Malaya and other parts of Southeast Asia, 
though The Times conceded that several of the revolutionary leaders, such 
as Aliman of Indonesia and Ho Chi-Minh of Indo-China, had spent several 
years in Russia or in communist service abroad.
19 The Times considered 
instead that communist parties were taking advantage of the unsettled 
conditions prevailing throughout the area at the end of the war, identifying 
themselves with nationalist anti-West feelings and opposing landlords and 
factory managers as well as the colonial governments in power.
20
Malayan Special Branch Perspective 
It may, therefore, be opportune to document the discussions that took place 
at Federal Special Branch headquarters in Kuala Lumpur at the early part 
of 1949, which were triggered by The Times (London) report. These 
discussions provide an interesting indication of the contemporaneous 
Malayan Police Special Branch perceptions, especially as they were not 
made public at the time. The author was then a junior Special Branch 
officer heading the Chinese section of Federal Special Branch 
headquarters. Two senior pre-war Malayan police officers, Ian S. Wylie, 
and his deputy Claude Fenner, then headed the Federal SB headquarters.  
They had both served with Force 136 in the Malayan jungle with the 
communist Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) in the latter 
part of WWII, and they were considered well informed about the CPM and 
its intentions.
21    
                                                 
18    Karl Hack, H-Diplo review article, ‘Malaya: Britain’s Asian Cold War’, 15 
June 2007. 
19    The Times (London), 17 June 1948. 
20    Ibid. The situation was further complicated by the civil war then raging in 
China between the Kuomintang and the Chinese communist armies that 
would lead eventually to the defeat of the Kuomintang and its retreat to 
Taiwan in 1949. 
21     Author’s contemporaneous notes. Wylie was subsequently to become 
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At the beginning of the Emergency in June 1948, the Special Branch was 
inclined to downplay the importance of the CPM’s uprising unless it 
received external support, and no reports of any such external assistance 
had been received. It began to look more closely at the situation, however, 
when captured documents revealed that the CPM was in written contact 
with Liu Shao-che, a top-ranking member of the Chinese Communist 
Party’s Central Committee and Lee Siu Nin (Li Hsien Nien), a PLA 
commander and top-ranking member of the CCP’s Central Committee.
  22  
It was apparent as well from an examination of CPM documents that fell 
into SB hands that the CPM attached importance to Mao Zedong’s On New 
Democracy (1940) and his “Theory of National Democratic Revolution”, 
which essentially adapted Marxist-Leninism for Chinese conditions to 
provide an ideological justification for China’s supporting communist 
revolutions in Southeast Asia.
23 In the early days of the Emergency before 
censorship of the press became more stringent, the local Chinese press 
                                                                                                             
Deputy Commissioner of the Malayan Police while Fenner (who had by 
then been knighted by both the Malayan and British governments as Tan 
Sri Sir Claude Fenner) was to become in 1963 the first Inspector-General of 
the Royal Malaysian Police before the post was Malayanised in 1966 and 
taken over by a local officer, Tun Mohammed Salleh (see Haji Asli 
Mohamed Redian & Haji Ibrahim Mohd. Radzua, Polis Diraja Malaysia: 
Sejarah, Peranan dan Cabaran, Kuala Lumpur: Kumpulan Karangkraf Sdn 
Bhd, 1987, 547).    
22    Later, as the Emergency progressed, the Special Branch was soon to revise its 
view of the seriousness of the situation as it became clear that the CPM and its 
guerrilla army, the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA), was an 
extremely formidable enemy that was following a long-established plan to 
overthrow the government and replace it with a Communist People’s 
Democratic Republic of Malaya. (See John Josiah Coe, “Beautiful Flowers 
and Poisonous Weeds. Problems of Historicism, Ethics and Internal 
Antagonisms – The Case of the Malayan Communist Party”, Appendix 3, 
“The Malayan Communist Party – A Chronological History”, PhD thesis, 
Department of History, University of Queensland, April 1993 (restricted). See 
CO 967/84, “Briefs Federation of Malaya, Political Developments in Malaya 
for fortnight ended 15 January 1949”, Secret (closed until 1981).    
23     Author’s notes. See also Chen Jie, “Shaking off a Historical Burden: 
China’s Relations with the ASEAN-based Communist Insurgencies in 
Deng’s Era”, Communist and Post-Communist Studies,  1994,  27(4),                    
443–462.   
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reported these matters in some detail and undoubtedly made a deep 
impression in the minds of local Chinese readers.
24
 
After weighing all of these factors and their knowledge of the local 
situation, the Special Branch came to the view that Soviet influence, as 
opposed to Chinese influence, was negligible in Malaya, and although the 
Soviets gave verbal support to the Malayan uprising in 1948, trade came 
before politics. In coming to this view, the Special Branch also took into 
account that the Soviets were interested in developing trade with Malaya, 
especially in purchasing rubber to build up their stocks that had been 
depleted during WWII. In 1946 and 1947, for instance, Exportkhleb, a 
Soviet trading corporation, had attempted to establish a representative trade 
office in Singapore to purchase rubber, and Soviet trade representatives had 
been allowed to make brief visits to Singapore.
25 There would therefore 
seem to be little purpose in the Soviet Union propagating revolution in 
Singapore or Malaya. 
 
The Special Branch also argued that it was only to be expected that Chin 
Peng, who was in favour of an armed uprising against the British colonial 
government and had meanwhile become secretary-general of the CPM in 
April 1947, would introduce his own policies after the disappearance of the 
former secretary-general, Lai Teck, who had absconded with the CPM’s 
                                                 
24    Author’s notes. See also CO 967/84, “Appeals of new China. Briefs 
Federation of Malaya”, Feb/March 1949, Secret (closed until 1981).  
25     A.M. Arinitohev and Papel Ivanovich Sizov, representing the Soviet 
trading corporation Exportkhleb, were granted temporary visas to visit 
Singapore from Hong Kong from 2–28 December 1946 and again on 18 
January 1947. However, nothing came of the Soviet attempt to establish a 
purchasing office in Singapore, and eventually most of the Soviet orders for 
natural rubber were placed through the London rubber market. (See the 
author’s Malaya’s Secret Police 1945–1960. The Role of the Special 
Branch in the Malayan Emergency, Singapore: ISEAS: Monash University 
Press, 2008, 14–15). For Soviet rubber purchases, see Geoffrey Jukes, The 
Soviet Union in Asia, Sydney: Angus & Robertson in association with The 
Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1973, 146. By 1963, according 
to Jukes, the Soviet Union surpassed the US as the largest purchaser of 
natural rubber from Malaya (ibid, 145).   
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funds.
26 Lai Teck, who had been inserted as a Special Branch agent in the 
CPM before WWII, had advocated an “open front” policy and was not in 
favour of an armed struggle, possibly because he was working secretly as a 
Special Branch agent.
27 Thus, the Special Branch came to the conclusion 
that because the CPM had been thwarted in its attempts to penetrate the 
trade union movement and bring about its aims to establish a “Democratic 
People’s Republic of Malaya” by “open front” activities, it had decided 
that the only way forward was to resort to violence to overthrow the 
government.
28
 
Regarding the questions posed at the beginning of this paper concerning 
the origins of the uprising, the author recollects that the Special Branch 
received at this time (1949) a copy of a classified report on the Calcutta 
Conferences from Simla, the Indian Intelligence Bureau. Although it went 
into some detail and described the general atmosphere of the meetings as 
                                                 
26    It is often overlooked that the policy advocated by Lai Teck was actually 
continued for a while after he absconded in March 1947. It was not until 
the CPM’s politburo met at Kuala Lumpur on 31 January 1948 some ten 
months later that his “right wing” policies were repudiated as “treacherous 
to the cause of the revolution” (Short, op. cit., 42).    
27     During the Japanese occupation, Lai Teck became a Japanese kempetai 
agent though this information did not become known to his comrades in the 
CPM until the early part of 1947, and he was to lead to his fleeing from 
Malaya, until he was finally tracked down several months later in Bangkok 
and killed.     
Lai Teck’s pre-war case officer in the Singapore Special Branch was F.I. 
(Innes) Tremlett. He escaped from Singapore at the time of the Japanese 
invasion, was commissioned in the British army, and became head of Force 
136’s Malayan country section in Ceylon (Sri Lanka). He returned briefly 
to Singapore at the end of the war and contacted Lai Teck, but he was 
tragically killed in an air crash in October 1945 on his way back to Ceylon 
(see the author’s Malaya’s Secret Police 1945–1960. The Role of the 
Special Branch in the Malayan Emergency, Melbourne & Singapore: 
Monash University Press/ ISEAS, Singapore, 2008, 95). 
28  As Stockwell put it, by the time a state of Emergency was declared in 
Malaya on 18 June 1948 – and in Singapore on 24 June – the situation was 
already tense and “teetering on the brink of a revolutionary situation”.  See 
A.J. Stockwell, “A widespread and long-concocted plot to overthrow 
government in Malaya? The Origins of the Malayan Emergency”, in Robert 
Holland (ed.), Emergencies and Disorder in the European Empires after 
1945, London, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1994, 67. 
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being extremely hostile to colonial rule, the report did not refer to the 
issuing of any “directives” that would fit in with the Soviet Conspiracy 
Theory.
29
 
Malayan Communist Party Viewpoint 
 
What was the view of Chin Peng, Secretary General of the Communist 
Party of Malaya?  At the “Chin Workshop” held at the Australian National 
University, Canberra, in February 1999, many years after the Special 
Branch had come to its conclusion, Chin Peng explained that the CPM’s 
change from “open front” policy to armed confrontation was brought about 
by the British colonial government’s pressure in tightening control over the 
trade unions, which placed the CPM in an intolerable position with only 
one way out.
30  According to Chin Peng, when the CPM decided to start an 
armed struggle, there had only been time to draft a “rough” plan of action, 
as it had originally intended to delay the uprising until October 1948, when 
the plan would have been finalised.    
 
Too Chee Chew (C.C. Too) who later became head of the government’s 
psychological warfare section, supported the Special Branch’s analysis.   
Writing much later in the New Straits Times, he quoted an old Chinese 
adage “Rather be the head of a chicken than the hindquarters of a bull’ to 
demonstrate his point. He explained that while the head of a chicken 
cannot exert much actual physical force, “it contains the brain, which 
issues orders and controls the actions of the whole chicken, the 
hindquarters of a bull pack a powerful kick but without a will of its own, it 
has to obey what the brain of the bull (chicken) orders”.  From this 
analogy, he reasoned that while the CPM leaders could be expected to take 
note of such international communist directives that happened to serve 
                                                 
29   Author’s notes. While the author was carrying out research in London in 
1992, he tried unsuccessfully to find a copy of this report in the India 
Office Records and Library and though an earlier publication under the 
aegis of the Indian Intelligence Bureau (Sir Horace Williamson, India and 
Communism, Simla Government Press, 1935, revised edition) dealing with 
international communism was available, it was not possible to trace the 
report referred to. 
30    Conversation Comber/Chin Peng, Ruby Restaurant, Dickson, Canberra, 19 
February 1999, Chin Peng, Chin Peng Workshop, Canberra, 22–23 
February 1999, and Chin Peng with Ian Ward & Norma Miraflor, Alias 
Chin Peng. My Side of History, Singapore: Media Masters, 2003, 204. 
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their purpose, they would infinitely prefer to be masters of their own 
destiny than “running dogs” or puppets of international communism.
31   
  
Visit of Lawrence (Lance) Sharkey, Communist Party of Australia to 
Singapore  
 
Lawrence (Lance) Sharkey, the acting general-secretary of the Communist 
Party of Australia (CPA), often figures largely in accounts of the beginning 
of the Malayan Emergency.
32 In February 1948, he had stopped off at 
Singapore on his way to Calcutta to attend the 2nd Congress of the 
Communist Party of India, and on his return, it is alleged that he was the 
emissary who carried a message from the Soviets to Chin Peng to take up 
arms against the British colonial government. According to what Chin 
Peng told the author in Canberra on 19 February 1999, Sharkey visited the 
CPM’s office at 218 Queen Street on 22 February 1948.
33 Chin Peng 
described it as a routine courtesy visit by an “older and respected member” 
of a fraternal communist party (Chin Peng was then twenty-four years old 
and Sharkey fifty). Although the two men had not previously met, their 
respective parties had been in contact with each other, and from time to 
time, they had exchanged fraternal greetings and copies of their respective 
                                                 
31    C. C. Too, “Armed Struggle that was doomed to Fail”, New Sunday Times 
(Kuala Lumpur), 3 December 1989. 
32    Lawrence (Lance) Louis Sharkey (1898–1967) was born in New South 
Wales, Australia. He was a coach maker by trade and later worked as a lift 
attendant. He was active in the trade union movement and after joining the 
Communist Party of Australia (CPA) in 1922, he was soon elected to the 
party’s central committee and became editor of the Workers’ Weekly. He 
visited Moscow in 1930 and was elected to the executive committee of the 
Comintern. From 1950 to 1965, he was general-secretary of the Australian 
communist party. In 1949, he was jailed for 18 months for sedition for 
asserting that Australian workers would welcome the Red Army into 
Australia. He was the author of several booklets and pamphlets such as The 
Communist Party Speaks, Australian Communists and Soviet Russia, 
Australia Marches On, Outline History of the Australian Communist Party, 
and so on (see John Arnold and Deirdre Morris (eds.), Monash 
Biographical Dictionary of 20th Century Australians, Melbourne: Reed 
Reference Publishing, 1994, 478–479, and W.A. Wood, The Life Story of 
L.A. Sharkey: Fighter for Freedom, Sydney: Current Book Distributors, 
1950, passim). 
33    Conversation Comber/Chin Peng, Ruby Restaurant, Dickson, Canberra, 19 
February 1999. 
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publications. Chin Peng said that aside from Sharkey’s enquiring whether 
he would be attending the Calcutta meetings, nothing substantial was 
discussed.    
 
On Sharkey’s return visit to Singapore on his way back to Australia, 
however, it was a different matter.  He stayed at the Raffles Hotel from              
9 March to 20 March 1948 whilst awaiting an onward connection to 
Australia. Chin Peng invited him to attend the 4th Plenary Session of the 
CPM’s Central Committee (17–21 March) at the CPM’s Singapore 
office.
34 Sharkey was interested to hear about the CPM’s activities in 
Malaya during the Japanese occupation, and he provided an account of 
what had been discussed at the 2nd
 CPI Congress in Calcutta. He took the 
opportunity to explain Zhdanov’s “two-camps” doctrine and the new 
Cominform policy.  He also described the intense “anti-colonial” feeling 
that had permeated the discussions at the congress. But Chin Peng stated  
that Sharkey did not convey any “instructions” or “message” from the 
Calcutta meeting to the CPM,
35 a denial that he subsequently repeated at 
the Chin Peng Workshop in Canberra, 22 February 1999.
36 In fact, in an 
earlier BBC TV interview in London on 19 June 1998, he had already 
denied that the hidden hand of the Soviets was behind the CPM’s 
uprising.
37  
 
                                                 
34   According to MSS sources, Sharkey invited the CPM to send a delegate to 
attend the 15th National Congress of the Australian Communist Party in 
Sydney, 7–10 May 1948. It is not known whether the CPM attended the 
Congress but in any event, it was then making final preparations for the 
armed struggle. (CO 537/3751. MSS “Malaya: Political Developments 
Political Intelligence Journals”, Top Secret, MSS PIJ no. 3 of 1948, 15 
February 1948). 
35    Conversation Comber/Chin Peng, Ruby Restaurant, Dickson, Canberra, 19 
February 1999.  
36    C.C. Chin & Karl Hack (eds.), Dialogues with Chin Peng: New Light on 
the Malayan Communist Party, Singapore: Singapore University Press, 
2004, 119–123, 140 notes 2 & 3, 258, 279, 286–287, 289. The Sydney 
Morning Herald reported on 18 August 1948 that an authoritative source 
said in Singapore yesterday that reports that an Australian Communist 
prompted the Malayan revolution were “absolute poppycock”. 
37      “Malaya: The Undeclared War (East Special)”, BBC 2 Film 
(NBH/1.001D), 19 June 1998.  
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In his autobiography, Chin Peng records the following exchange with 
Sharkey that took place during the CPM’s 4th Plenary Session as follows:  
 
A Central Committee member in charge of trade union 
affairs asked our guest the critical question for which we 
had been seeking answers for months. “Comrade,” he 
requested, “how do you Australians deal with strike-
breakers?”      
                                                                                                                                                                   
The meeting eagerly awaited Sharkey’s views on 
strikebreakers and how his party handled them... Sharkey 
gazed along the row of Asian faces at the table and said 
bluntly, “We get rid of them.”... You mean you eliminate 
strikebreakers, Comrade... kill?’ (Sharkey replied) “But 
not in the cities.  Only in the outlying areas. The rural 
areas. The mining areas.” However, in spite of Sharkey 
portraying the Australian communists in such a belligerent 
light there is no evidence that he urged the CPM to resort 
to arms against the British. Nevertheless, he must have 
made an impression on the CPM’s Central Committee 
members as Chin Peng described his visit as “inspiring”.
38
  
After the Calcutta conferences, a group of foreign communists took the 
opportunity to visit Singapore. Among the group were Carmen Brickman, 
a member of the International Union of Students (IUS) Secretariat, Olga 
                                                 
38    Chin Peng, op. cit., 203–205. During his stay in Singapore, the Malayan 
Security Service kept Sharkey under surveillance, and he was seen to keep 
company with Edward Lynch, assistant to the Movements Officer in the 
Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia’s office, and a certain J.R.R. 
Towner, both of whom were known to have left-wing sympathies. Lynch 
had first come to notice during enquiries made by the MSS into leakages of 
secret information from the Commissioner-General’s office although he 
himself was not implicated. It has not been possible to ascertain what 
action if any was taken against them. (See CO 537/3751, MSS PIJ no. 2/48, 
Secret Appendix no. 3, 61, MSS PIJ no. 6/48 dated 31 March 1948, p. 172; 
CO 537/3753 MSS PIJ no. 14/48, Supplement no. 9, dated 31 July 1948,                  
1–21; “How Moscow’s Decisions Plunged South East Asia into Bloodshed 
in 1948” by Douglas Hyde, Arkib Negara, Kuala Lumpur Misc. 16, 
Malayan Federal Government Press Statement D.Inf. 7/60/160 (Emerg.) 
Appendix “I”; and Short, op. cit., 52–53. 
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Tchet-Chetkins, a Russian, Jean Lautissier from France, Rajko Tomovic 
from Yugoslavia, and Dusan Puhalo, a Yugoslav journalist and a 
representative of the World Federation of Democratic Youth.  While this is 
not mentioned in Chin Peng’s autobiography, the CPM and other left-wing 
organisations welcomed the group at a mammoth public reception.  Puhalo 
was later detained by the Singapore Police (the Malayan Security Service 
had no powers of arrest) and was put on an aircraft bound for Calcutta.  
The records do not reveal why Puhalo was singled out in this way, but the 
Yugoslav delegates to the Calcutta conferences were of particular 
intelligence interest as the headquarters of the Cominform was then based 
in Belgrade.
39
  
Although no decision was taken to start an armed uprising during the 4th 
Plenary Session of the CEC held at the CPM’s headquarters at Queen 
Street, Singapore, Chin Peng said that the CPM’s post-war political line 
(i.e., the “open front” policy advocated by the discredited Lai Teck) was 
criticised as “right-wing opportunism”.
40 Chin Peng made clear that it 
appeared inevitable from the tone of the meeting that the party would 
inexorably move to a policy of armed resistance.
41 The actual decision to 
start an armed uprising was taken at the 5th Plenary Session of the CEC on 
10 May 1948, two months after Sharkey left Singapore, at the “Saling 
Rubber Estate”, 17½ milestone Johore Bahru-Kulai Road, near Kulai in 
Johore.
42  A resolution was passed at this meeting to take “resolute action, 
concerted struggle and the use of violence when necessary”, but there was 
no mention of any Soviet instruction. 
 
                                                 
39   CO 537/3753 MSS PIJ no. 14/48, Secret,  Supplement no. 9, dated 31 July 
1948, 11–21. 
40    Conversation Comber/Chin Peng, Ruby Restaurant, Dickson, Canberra, 19 
February 1999 and ANU restaurant, 22 February 1999. 
41    Chin Peng, Chin Peng Workshop, The Australian National University, 
Canberra, 22–23 February 1999; Short, op. cit., 49, 50–51; and Stubbs, op. 
cit., 60–61. Short refers to it as “ideological preparation” (for an 
insurrection) (Short, op. cit., 49), and Stubbs as a move to a policy of 
armed resistance’ (Stubbs, op. cit., 60). 
42    Conversation Comber/Chin Peng, Ruby Restaurant, Dickson, Canberra, 19 
February 1999. Chin Peng said he had afterwards been unable to identify 
the name of the estate on the map of Johore. Stubbs, op. cit., 61, gives the 
place of the meeting as Singapore, but this is clearly incorrect.  
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On returning to Australia, Sharkey gave his version of what had transpired 
at the CPM meeting he had attended in Singapore, and on 18 June 1948, he 
wrote an account for the Tribune, the organ of the Central Committee of 
the  Communist  Party  of  Australia  for  which  he  was  then  the  editor:                    
“I certainly told them (the CPM leaders) that a struggle for national 
independence to prevent the old colonial slavery from being imposed on 
them was justified and would be supported by the whole of progressive 
mankind.  Such questions as when they should start an armed insurrection 
or whether they should start one at all ... are a matter for the Malayans and 
one in which they are much more experienced than I am, as they had a very 
rich experience in the heroic struggle with the Japanese occupiers.”
43  
 
In the Tribune of 14 August 1948, Sharkey pointed out that ’Always the 
Communist Party is supposed to be “ordered” from outside to do this, that 
or the other thing: whereas wars of national independence cannot be 
conjured up by “instructions” from anyone but arise out of existing 
conditions.” 
  
Before moving on, it is fitting to refer to the allegation made by Cecil 
Sharpley, a disgruntled former member of the Communist Party of 
Australia, in his book The Great Delusion. Sharpley stated that Sharkey 
had informed the 15th Congress of the Communist Party of Australia, 
which was held at Sydney in May 1948, that he had been commissioned by 
the Cominform to pass on a message to the CPM to rise up against British 
colonial rule in Malaya.
44   
  
However, there is no mention of this announcement in the minutes of the 
Congress that have been examined by the author.
45 In his report, Sharkey 
spoke about post-war international tension and the potentially dangerous 
division of the world into two camps.  He said that the 2
nd Congress of the 
CPI, which he had attended, had been hostile to British, Dutch, and French 
                                                 
43   See Melbourne University Archives (119 Barry Street, Carlton, 
Melbourne), “CPA Congresses, 15th Congress, May 1948, For Australia 
Prosperous and Independent, Report by L.L. Sharkey to the 15th Congress 
of the Australian Communist Party”, 3, 5, 12, and 31. 
44  Cecil H. Sharpley, The Great Delusion. The Autobiography of an ex-
Communist Leader, London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1952, 92. 
45    See “Report by L.L. Sharkey to the 15th Congress of the Australian 
Communist Party, May 1948”, pamphlet printed at Newsletter Printing, 21 
Ross St., Forest Lodge. 
54 Case of the Communist Party of Malaya 
imperialism, and he added that it had praised colonial liberation 
movements in Southeast Asia. Sharkey also paid tribute to the great 
struggle of the Chinese people against the forces of imperialism under the 
banner of the Chinese Communist Party. However, there is no mention 
anywhere of his having conveyed a directive for revolution to the CPM 
from Calcutta.
46  
 
 
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
 
To sum up, this paper has focused predominantly on the views of the 
Malayan Special Branch concerning the origin of the CPM’s uprising 
against the British colonial government in Malaya. It has argued from the 
evidence assembled by the Special Branch that the CPM’s uprising arose 
from its own local dynamics rather than from any “instruction” issued to it 
from the Soviets, and it has argued that the CPM made its decision to resort 
to armed confrontation because its efforts to overthrow the government by 
“open front” activities had failed. The CPM therefore considered that the 
only way for it to achieve its aims was by resorting to an armed uprising. 
Significantly, the views arrived at as early as 1949 by the Malayan Special 
Branch are corroborated by contemporary research that mined the recently 
                                                 
46    The Sydney Morning Herald of 18 June 1948 reported that “The officers 
(security officials) declare there is no evidence that Russia or any other 
overseas body is directing the challenge to the Malayan Government.”   
The Japanese scholar Tanigawa Yoshihiko provides confirmation of this 
view in his study on the Cominform and Southeast Asia, in the following 
words: the basic cause of the Malayan struggle cannot be found in any 
external “directive” as argued by the Soviet conspiracy theorists, but rather 
in the indigenous independence movement itself.’ (Tanigawa Yoshihiko, 
“The Cominform and Southeast Asia” in Yonosuke Nagai and Akira Iniye 
(eds.),  The Origins of the Cold War in Asia, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1977, 363, 372–373).  In his study “The End of Empire, 
Harper confirms this view as follows: “However, there is little evidence 
that this meant its (CPM’s) strategy was dictated by the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union or by any advice from outside.” (T.N. Harper, The End 
of Empire and the Making of Malaya, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999, 145). 
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opened Russian archives in Moscow as confirmed by Dr L. M. Efimova at 
the  Roundtable  on  the  Sixtieth  Anniversary  of  1948  “Reassessing                 
the Origins of the  Cold War in Southeast Asia” at the Asian Research 
Institute , National University of Singapore, 10–11 July 2008.
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